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Why the EU Is Failing in Its
Neighbourhood: The Case of Armenia
Lieve VAN HOOF*
As the Arab Spring has made clear, the EU’s strategic aim of being surrounded by a ring of
secure, democratic, and prosperous friends has not yet materialized. While most previous
analyses have found fault with inconsistent application of conditionality, this article locates the
root of the problem with an the EU’s institutional set-up. Starting from interviews and
documentary analysis, it uses Armenia as a case study to demonstrate how competition within
and between the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission has led to internal,
horizontal, and vertical inconsistencies that have seriously hampered the EU’s capacity to
promote reforms. If recent institutional reforms have been designed to address precisely these
problems, sociological rational choice and historical institutionalism suggest that it remains to be
seen to what extent these recent reforms and initiatives will be able to bring about a change
substantial enough to make the EU more successful in its neighbourhood.
1 INTRODUCTION
As the Arab Spring has made clear, the EU, in spite of its ambitious plans and
substantial investments, is not surrounded by a ring of secure, democratic, and
prosperous friends. This article examines what has gone wrong in the EU’s
neighbourhood policy. If, in the light of recent events, politicians and scholars
have looked South first and foremost, this article focuses on a country in the
EU’s Eastern neighbourhood: Armenia.This country is a good case study for two
reasons. On the one hand, it displays the typical characteristics that the EU does
not want to see in its neighbourhood: it is at war with Azerbaijan over
Nagorno-Karabakh, its road to democracy is still long and arduous, and its
economy is in shatters.1 On the other hand, it defies the traditional explanation
for the EU’s failure in its neighbourhood, that is to say, the inconsistent
* Dr Lieve Van Hoof holds a Ph.D in Classics, an M.Sc. in EU Studies, and an additional degree in
History. She has held positions at the universities of Exeter (U.K.), Leuven (Belgium), and Bonn
(Germany), and has published a monograph on Plutarch (OUP, 2010) as well as numerous articles.
One of her research interests is Armenia, on which she has collaborated with Prof. Hendrik Vos of
the Political Sciences Department at Ghent University.
1 N. Babayan, ‘Armenia: Why the European Neighbourhood Policy Has Failed’, FRIDE Policy Brief
(Madrid: Pride, 2011), 68; S. Fischer & E. Lannon, The ENP Strategic Review: The EU and Its
Neighbourhood at a Crossroads (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2011); A. Hug (ed.), Spotlight on
Armenia (London:The Foreign Policy Centre, 2011), 6.
Van Hoof, Lieve. ‘Why the EU Is Failing in Its Neighbourhood:The Case of Armenia’. European
Foreign Affairs Review 17, no. 2 (2012): 285–302.
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application of conditionality: what went wrong in the neighbourhood according
to previous scholars is that the EU, as a normative power, imposed noble
conditions but behaved as a realist actor privileging its interests, above all
energy.2 Following the logic of this explanation, however, the EU’s policy in the
South Caucasus should have favoured Azerbaijan or at least have pressed for a
solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as soon as possible. Thus far, neither
has been the case. Had the EU acted as a true normative power, conversely, it
would have given preferential treatment to Georgia as a beacon of
democratization in the region. Except for a one-off donation made at an
international donor conference in the wake of the August 2008
Russian-Georgian war, this has not been the case either. Under the current
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) funding
programme, for example, Armenia (EUR 157.3 million) receives indeed slightly
less than Georgia (EUR 180.3 million), slightly more than Azerbaijan (EUR
122.5 million) in absolute terms,3 yet per person or per square kilometre, it does
far better than either of its neighbours.Why, then, has the EU nevertheless failed
to make Armenia substantially more democratic or secure?
While previous accounts thus broadly fit within either the realist or the
liberal paradigm, this article draws inspiration above all from the various new
institutionalist approaches, which turn attention from interests and ideas towards
institutions.4 This is not to say that ideas and interests play no role, yet in order
to understand precisely which role, we must look at the institutional framework
within which they are pursued. One of the core issues to be addressed will
therefore be intra- and inter-institutional coherence. Using the terminology of
Gebhard, I shall show that one of the main reasons for the failure of the EU’s
policy towards Armenia is the lack of internal, horizontal, and vertical coherence.
Institutional incoherence has, moreover, been mirrored in academic
2 V. Khasson, S. Vasilyan & H. Vos, ‘Everybody Needs Good Neighbours: The EU and Its
Neighbourhood’, in Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the European Union, ed. J. Orbie
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 217–237, at 223; L. Simão & M.R. Freire, ‘The EU’s Neighborhood
Policy and the South Caucasus: Unfolding New Patterns of Cooperation’, Caucasian Review of
International Affairs 2, no. 4 (2008): 225–239; N. Mikhelidze, Eastern Partnership and Conflicts in the
South Caucasus: Old Wine in New Skins? (Rome: IAI, 2009), 6–7; Fischer & Lannon, 2011, supra n. 1;
C. Grant, A New Neighbourhood Policy for the EU (London: Centre for European Reform, 2011), 10.
Commissioner Füle recently presented the same analysis in an address to Armenian civil society, at
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/documents/news/civil_society_speech_clean_20110429_
en.pdf>.
3 See <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_armenia_en.pdf>, <http://ec.eur
opa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_azerbaijan_en.pdf>, and <http://ec.europa.eu/wor
ld/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_georgia_en.pdf>.
4 See P. Hall & R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political Studies 44,
no. 5 (1996): 936–957; S.Vanhoonacker, ‘The Institutional Framework’, in International Relations and
the European Union, ed. C. Hill & M.E. Smith, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
75–100.
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output on EU-Armenia relations,5 with scholars focusing either on the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),6 largely managed by the Commission,
or on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),7 which falls under the
exclusive remit of the Council. By not transcending these institutional divisions,
scholars have reproduced them not only in the sense that they have copied them,
but also in the sense that they have contributed to their continuation. Given the
recent reforms in EU foreign policy, designed exactly to tackle issues of
coherence and integration, it is high time for scholarship not only to follow suit
and overcome compartmentalization but also to point out the pitfalls that the
European External Action Service (EEAS) risks falling into. With the defrosting
of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and a series of important elections, as
well as the centenary of the 1915 events coming up in Armenia over the next
couple of years, a comprehensive analysis and approach will come none too
soon.
Methodologically, this article is based on interviews and documentary
analysis. After a brief survey of the development and current state of
5 C. Gebhard, ‘Coherence’, in ed. Hill & Smith, 2011, supra n. 4, 101–127. Cf. also A. Duleba, L.
Najšlová,V. Bencˇ & V. Bilcˇík (eds), The Reform of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Tools, Institutions,
and a Regional Dimension (Bratislava: Research Centre of the SFPA, 2008), 47–50; A. Akçakoca et al.,
‘After Georgia: Conflict Resolution in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood’, EPC Issue Paper 57
(Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2009), 34–35; Mikhelidze, 2009, supra n. 2; S. Schäffer & D.
Tolksdorf (eds), ‘The EU Member States and the Eastern Neighbourhood: From Composite to
Consistent EU Foreign Policy?’, CAP Policy Analysis 1 (Munich: Centre for Applied Policy
Research, 2009), 4; D. Sammut, ‘The European Union’s Increased Engagement with the South
Caucasus’, in The Black Sea Region and EU Policy, ed. K. Henderson & C. Weaver (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2010), 83; Grant, 2011, supra n. 2; and especially A. Huff, The Role of EU Defence Policy in
the Eastern Neighbourhood (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2011).
6 D. Irrera, ‘Enlarging the Ring of Friends: Lessons from the European Neighbourhood Policy in the
Southern Caucasus’, paper prepared for the ECPR – Standing Group on the European Union
(Riga, 25–27 Sep. 2008); C. Browning & G. Christou, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy and
the Eastern Dimension: Borders, Security and Identity’, Political Geography 29, no. 2 (2008): 109–118;
N. Babayan, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy in Armenia: On the Road to Failure or Success?’,
CEU Political Science Journal 4, no. 3 (2009): 358–388; R. Giragosian, ‘Armenia’s Crisis for the
Non-democrats’, in Democracy’s Plight in the European Neighbourhood: Struggling Transitions and
Proliferating Dynasties, ed. M. Emerson & R.Youngs (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies,
2009), 84–91; Human Rights Watch, ‘Democracy on Rocky Ground: Armenia’s Disputed 2008
Presidential Election, Post-election Violence, and the One-Sided Pursuit of Accountability’, at
<www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/armenia0209web.pdf>; T. Mkrtchyan, ‘Armenia’s European
Future’, in The European Union and the South Caucasus, ed. T. Mkrtchyan, T. Huseynov &
K. Gogolashvili (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 14–48; A. Christensen, The Making of the
European Neighbourhood Policy (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010); Babayan, 2011, supra n. 1; Fischer &
Lannon, 2011, supra n. 1; Hug, 2011, supra n. 1; S. Vasilyan, ‘The “European” “Neighbourhood”
“Policy”: A Holistic Account’, in The European Union and Global Governance: A Handbook, ed. J.-W.
Wunderlich & D. Bailey (London & NewYork: Routledge), 177–186.
7 A. Grigorian, ‘The EU and the Karabakh Conflict’, in The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU,
ed. D. Lynch (Paris: Institute for Security Studies), 129–142; International Crisis Group, ‘Conflict
Resolution in the South Caucasus:The EU’s Role’, Europe Report 173 (Brussels: International Crisis
Group, 2006); T. De Waal, The Karabakh Trap: Dangers and Dilemmas of the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict
(London: Conciliation Resources, 2008); Sammut, 2010, supra n. 5; Huff, 2010, supra n. 5.
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EU-Armenia relations, three sections examine the contribution of the European
Parliament, the Council, and the Commission to those relations through a
detailed analysis of the internal working of each institution as exemplified by
recent important decisions affecting the EU’s policy towards Armenia. The final
section sums up how the EU’s institutional set-up has affected its policy not only
towards Armenia but also towards its neighbourhood more generally.
2 DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATE OF EU – ARMENIA
RELATIONS
In the years following the implosion of the Soviet Union, the European
Commission established diplomatic relations with Armenia. In 1999, a Delegation
branch was opened in Yerevan, which was transformed into a full-fledged
European Commission Delegation in 2008 and into an EU Delegation since the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In the meanwhile, the EU had signed a
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Armenia, as with its neighbours
Georgia and Azerbaijan, which entered into force in 1999 and still forms the
backbone of EU-Armenia relations today. The focus of the agreement is firmly
on trade and trade-related issues, but political cooperation was also established in
the form of a Cooperation Council at ministerial level (Article 78) and a
Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (PCC) (Article 83).
While the EU thus built out bilateral relations with the South Caucasus
states, it was much less active on a multilateral level. As far as the resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is concerned, the EU has always shone through
its absence: the 1994 ceasefire was brokered by Russia, and negotiations ever
since have been mediated by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) Minsk group co-chaired by France, Russia, and the United
States. Nevertheless, from 2003 onwards – with a brief but, as we shall see,
significant interruption in 2011 – the EU has had a Special Representative for
the South Caucasus, who could, in theory, deal with multilateral questions such
as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia received a further impulse
in 2004, when the ENP was launched. Within this framework, an Action Plan
sets out the priorities of EU-Armenia relations, financial aid is provided mainly
through the ENPI, and Country Reports assess effective progress on a regular
basis. Apart from an economic downturn largely linked to the global economic
crisis, the main problems identified in the latest report, covering the year 2010,
are twofold. First, concerns were voiced in the field of democratic reforms and
the independence of the judiciary, particularly with regard to the violent
clamp-down of street protests following presidential elections in 2008. This is
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especially important in view of the upcoming elections for Parliament in May
20128 and for President in February 2013. Second, Armenia has got a
problematic relationship with many of its neighbours: relations with Turkey have
been difficult at least since 1915; the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict troubles
relations with Azerbaijan; and Armenia’s cooperation with Russia complicates its
relations with Georgia. After a brief period of hope, all of these axes of
opposition and collaboration right now seem to be profiling themselves again
more strongly. It remains to be seen what the impact or consequences of the
EU’s 2011 plan to step up the ENP’s conditionality, thus turning it into a New
and Ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy (NAENP), will be in Armenia.
At the Prague Summit of May 2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was
launched to embody the Eastern dimension of the ENP and to enhance it in
several important respects. Thus on a bilateral basis, the EU is currently
negotiating an Association Agreement with Armenia that will replace the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and integrate the Action Plan; at the
time of publication, twenty-two out of twenty-eight negotiation chapters have
been closed and the launch of negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area has just been announced. At the same time, the EaP improves the
ENP by adding a multilateral dimension. This dimension is organized around
four thematic platforms (democracy, good governance, and stability; economic
integration and convergence with EU policies; energy security; contacts between
people) and brings the EU and its Eastern partners together on a multilateral
basis in two-yearly summits, yearly meetings of foreign ministers, a parliamentary
assembly called EURONEST, and a civil society forum. For the first time, then,
the EU is effectively bringing Armenians, Azeris, and Georgians together.
3 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:AN AMBITIOUS HOUSE
DIVIDED
Although often neglected,9 the European Parliament has played an active role in
all major EU initiatives towards the South Caucasus. While the Commission’s
8 A survey of Armenia’s political parties and their position under the current parliamentary term, as of
the country’s political history since the late 1980s, can be found in Hug, 2011, supra n. 1, 6–9.
9 Parliament’s role in foreign policy, D.Viola, European Foreign Policy and the European Parliament in the
1990s: An Investigation into the Role and Voting Behaviour of the European Parliament’s Political Groups
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); U. Diedrichs, ‘The European Parliament in CFSP’, The International
Spectator 2 (2004): 31–46; A. Maurer, D. Kietz & C. Völkel, ‘Interinstitutional Agreements in the
CFSP: Parliamentarization through the Back Door?’, European Foreign Affairs Review 10, no. 2 (2005):
175–195; F. Zanon, ‘The European Parliament: An Autonomous Foreign Policy Identity for the
European Parliament?’, in The Role of Parliaments in European Foreign Policy, ed. Barbé &
A. Herranz (Barcelona: Office of the European Parliament in Barcelona, 2005); B. Crum,
‘Parliamentarization of the CFSP Through Informal Institution-Making?’, Journal of European Public
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initial proposal on ‘Wider Europe’ explicitly excluded the South Caucasus,10 for
example, Parliament pleaded for the region’s inclusion in what was to become
the ENP.11 Likewise, it was Parliament that pushed for a Special Representative
to be sent to the South Caucasus.12 As a result of the Lisbon Treaty (Article 218
TFEU), Parliament will now also have to give its consent to the Association
Agreement that is currently being negotiated.13 That other European institutions
got this message is clear from the invitation of a Member of the European
Parliament (MEP),Tomasz Poreba (ECR, Poland), to sit in on the negotiations.
In May 2010, Parliament adopted Resolution 2216 entitled The Need for an
EU Strategy for the South Caucasus. The first part of the Resolution discusses
security issues and peaceful resolution of conflicts (points 2–17), progress towards
democratization and respect for human rights and the rule of law (points 18–24),
and economic issues and social development (points 25–32). The second part of
the Resolution (points 33–56) sets out how the EU can, and should, contribute
to the development of the South Caucasus in the areas discussed in the first part.
Resolution 2216 thus shows a clear grasp of the problems facing the South
Caucasus and makes suggestions for an EU strategy to tackle them. Coming
shortly after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and shortly before the
opening of association agreement negotiations with the South Caucasus states, as
well as the formal launch of the EEAS, it is directed first and foremost at other
EU institutions. Hence there are frequent frequent and explicit calls upon the
Commission, the Council, and the High Representative of the Union for
Policy 13, no. 3 (2006): 383–401; C. Bickerton, European Union Foreign Policy: From Effectiveness to
Functionality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 69–70. None of these discusses Armenia, and
most of them have been outdated by the Lisbon Treaty.
10 European Commission, ‘Wider Europe: Accepting the Challenge’ (2003), 4 note 4, <http://
ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf>.
11 European Parliament, ‘EU Policy towards South Caucasus’ (2004), point 1, <www.europarl.
europa.eu/registre/seance_pleniere/textes_adoptes/definitif/2004/02-26/0122/P5_TA(2004)0122_E
N.pdf>; J. Leinen & S.Weidemann, ‘How Does ENP Work? AView from the European Parliament’,
in European Neighbourhood Policy: Challenges for the EU-Policy towards the New Neighbours, ed.
J.Varwick & K.-O. Lang (Opladen & Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2007), 49–60;
P. Kratochvíl & E. Tulmets, Constructivism and Rationalism in EU External Relations (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 2010), 127–136. For other reasons for including the South Caucasus, see K. Gogolashvili,
‘The EU and Georgia:The Choice Is in the Context’, in ed. Mkrtchyan, Huseynov & Gogolashvili,
2009, supra n. 6, 90–127, at 97 et seq.
12 European Parliament, ‘EU Relations with South Caucasus’ (2002), point 7, <www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P5-TA-2002-0085+0+DOC
+PDF+V0//EN>; D. Lynch, ‘The EU:Towards a Strategy’, in The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the
EU, ed. D. Lynch (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 171–196, at 183.
13 The changes of Art. 218 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union compared to Art. 300
TEC turn Parliament into a ‘strong policy-making power’ (M. Mezey, Comparative Legislatures
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1979), 26) in this field. As such powers have earlier turned
Parliament into a major player in other policy areas (D. Judge & D. Earnshaw, The European
Parliament (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 182–184), this can be expected in respect to
agreements with third countries too.
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Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European
Commission (HR/VP);14 hence there are also full references to Parliament’s
newly acquired right ‘to be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the
process of the negotiation of Association Agreements’ (point 34) and to the fact
that the Association Agreements ‘will require the assent of the European
Parliament’ (provision I). Resolution 2216, then, was an ambitious parliamentary
project to assert its influence over the Union’s policy towards Armenia. In actual
practice, however, it is difficult not to see it as a failure: Armenians criticized it
for being ‘non pro-Armenian’,15 Member State diplomats and EEAS officials
consider it proof of Parliament overplaying its powers,16 and MEPs who voted in
favour of the Resolution have since then publicly rejected it, as became clear at
the most recent PCC-meeting. If, as will be shown below, the Council and the
EEAS might have been reluctant to follow Parliament’s suggestions of a strategy
for the South Caucasus anyway, the main reason why they, alongside other actors
involved, could dismiss the Resolution so easily was Parliament’s demand for ‘the
withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan’ (point
8, italics added) – a demand that goes a step too far compared to the Madrid
principle that the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh be returned to
Azerbaijani control.17 This contradicts Parliament’s own support of the Madrid
Principles in point 7 and as such undermines its internal coherence. In addition,
it clashes with official EU policy. Although parliamentary resolutions do not
represent official EU policy, such a statement by an important EU institution
greatly hampered official EU-Armenia relations in the months following the
adoption of Resolution 2216.18 Horizontal EU incoherence thus had a negative
impact on the EU’s external action, and Resolution 2216 backfired not only on
the European Parliament but also on the EU as a whole.
The tenth EU-Armenia PCC meeting, which took place in December
2010, attracted much less attention not only within the EU and internationally,
but also within the European Parliament: of the eighteen European Parliament
delegation members, only four MEPs and a substitute attended.While this poor
14 Calls upon Commission: 18, 26–28, 34, 36–37, 41, 43, 45–46, 49–53, and 55; Council: 11, 27, 37, 42,
45, and 55;VP/HR: 17, 37, and 42.
15 See <www.ces.am/index.php/en/events/news/centre-news/122-artur-ghazinyans-interview-with-a1
-about-the-resolution-2216-adopted-by-the-european-parliament17062010>. While many Arme-
nians criticized the Resolution’s rapporteur, Evgeni Kirilov, ad hominem, the phrase quoted did not
figure in Kirilov’s draft report but stems from an amendment proposed by Inese Vaidere (EPP,
Latvia).
16 Interviews with Member State diplomats and EEAS efficials.
17 M. Dietzen, ‘A New Look at Old Principles: Making the Madrid Document Work’, Caucasus
Edition, 1 Apr. 2011, <http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/why-nagorno-karabakh%e2%80%99s-
status-must-be-addressed-first/>.
18 Interview with European External Action Service officer.
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attendance can be explained by MEP’s busy agendas, it also shows that
parliamentary cooperation with Armenia is not, for most members of the
delegation, a priority.19 Nevertheless, a look at the meeting and the document it
produced provides two important clues regarding Parliament’s participation in
EU-Armenia relations. The meeting itself showed deep divisions within the
European Parliament along national rather than party lines. Indeed, while the
delegation proportionally represents the various parliamentary fractions, fifteen
out of eighteen members come from new Member States. To an extent, this is
logical: like the French in the Mediterranean, the central and eastern European
MEPs tend to have more interest(s) in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood.20 The
historical, political, and linguistic affinities they have with EaP countries
sometimes effectively facilitate cooperation.21 At the same time, however, the
shared experience, especially of Russian dominance, also risks to bias the
delegation. As we shall see in the next section, many new Member States
cultivate closer links with Azerbaijan than with Armenia. As a result, the uneven
spread in national background of the delegation members disposes it less
favourably towards Armenia. Indeed, during the PCC meeting, the strongest
critic of Armenia was a Bulgarian, Evgeni Kirilov (S&D), while Armenia’s most
outspoken advocate was the only French MEP on the delegation, Damien Abad
(EPP). At first sight, one might think here of a political rather than a
geographical split, with the EPP supporting (Christian) Armenia versus the S&D
(non-Christian) Azerbaijan. Yet the Lithuanian Vytautas Landsbergis, although
from the EPP, aligned himself with Kirilov rather than with Abad. Against the
general trend of increasing party and decreasing national cohesion in the
European Parliament,22 the delegation members present at the PCC meeting are
thus divided along geographical lines. The second clue is provided by the Final
Statements and Recommendations that the meeting agreed upon.23 The European
Parliament draft call ‘to put an end to all cases of violence against journalists’ was
replaced in the final version with the call ‘for swift and thorough investigation of
all cases of violence against journalists’ (provision 18). A similar formative
19 On delegations, see R. Corbett, F. Jacobs & M. Shackleton, The European Parliament (London: John
Harper Publishing, 2005); A. Herranz, ‘Inter-Parliamentary Delegations of the European Parliament:
National and European Priorities at Work’, in Barbé & Herranz, 2005, supra n. 9.
20 Corbett, Jacobs & Shackleton, 2005, supra n. 19, 57–59, and Herranz, 2005, supra n. 19.
21 M. Dangerfield, ‘The Contribution of theVisegrad Group to the European Union’s “Eastern” Policy:
Rhetoric or Reality?’, in The European Union, Russia and the Shared Neighbourhood, ed. J. Gower & G.
Timmins (London & NewYork: Routledge, 2011), 51–57, at 52.
22 S. Hix, A.G. Noury & G. Roland, Democratic Politics in the European Parliament (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 54–71. As Bickerton (2011, supra n. 9, 71) points out, however,
Parliament generally suffers from a lack of political division when it comes to foreign policy.
23 The fact that Final Statements and Recommendations were signed is an important achievement in itself,
as became painfully clear at the last two Parliamentary Cooperation Committee meetings with
Azerbaijan, where no such conclusion could be agreed upon.
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Armenian influence on the text can be sensed in the reference to the ‘equal
rights and self-determination of peoples’ (provision 22), which had been left out
of Resolution 2216, or in the belief ‘that all parties to the conflict should
become involved in the negotiation process’ (provision 23), voicing the
Armenians’ wish that Nagorno-Karabakh be given a voice in the negotiations.24
Nevertheless, if one compares the Final Statements and Recommendations to the
Armenian draft, the Armenians also gave in on important issues: Armenian regret
over Resolution 2216 was written out of the final version, critical remarks on
Azerbaijan were avoided,25 and all calls upon the Commission were abandoned.
Notwithstanding the lack of formal powers held by parliamentary delegations as
compared to committees, then, such signs of socialization form an important
argument in favour of delegations.26
The European Parliament, so we can conclude, is an ambitious institution: it
eagerly uses any instruments at its disposal to push for stronger EU engagement
in Armenia. Meagre attendance at the PCC meeting suggests, however, that
Parliament’s aim in doing so lies not so much with a true interest in Armenia as
with promoting its own position within the EU. While divergences of opinion,
running along national rather than political lines, are easily sidelined in pursuit of
this aim, Resolution 2216 shows that lack of internal coherence has jeopardized
Parliament’s ambitions vis-a-vis Council as well as Commission.
4 THE COUNCIL:WINNING BY LOSING?
In the latest parliamentary debate on the topic, it was pointed out that the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is ‘preventing the Eastern Partnership from
succeeding’.27 As an indirect approach has yielded no tangible results,28 greater
EU contribution to the resolution of the conflict will have to involve CFSP
24 Compare thse Armenian draft Final Statements and Recommendations, provision 36.
25 Armenian draft Final Statements and Recommendations on regret: provision 4; on Azerbaijan: provisions
33–34; calls upon the Commission: provisions 8, 10, 11, 35, 44.
26 J. Checkel, ‘International Institutions as Community Builders’, in International Institutions and
Socialization in Europe, ed. J. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3–27, at 5–9;
cf. Herranz, 2005, supra n. 19, 9; F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central
and Eastern Europe (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2005). F. Schimmelfennig, S. Engert
& H. Knobel, International Socialization in Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality and
Democratic Change (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 255, have shown, however, that
socialization works best if EU membership can be expected.
27 See <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20110706+ITEM
-014+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>. Cf. also A. Harutyunyan, Neighborhood Relations
between the EU and Armenia (Budapest: Central European University, 2006), 34.
28 Fischer & Lannon, 2011, supra n. 1, 2 & 5.
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and/or ESDP,29 which, even with the Lisbon Treaty in force, fall under the remit
of the Council (Article 24 TEU). In this section, I analyse the Council’s reasons
for not making use of its powers notwithstanding Parliament30 and
Commission31 references welcoming CFSP involvement.
The key to the problem lies with a profound division among EU Member
States. Although publicly accessible Council documents do their best to conceal
these divergences of opinion, at least three elements of division can be
determined indirectly via interviews or national policy statements. First, certain
Member States have traditionally had closer links with Armenia, others with
Azerbaijan. Greece, for example, has cultural-historical links with Armenia,32 and
France is home to a 500,000-strong Armenian diaspora. As a result, Greece and
France have often fostered Armenia within the EU. Currently, for example,
France boasts that it ‘a oeuvré, au sein des instances européennes, pour un
lancement rapide des négotiations sur le futur accord d’association’.33 Other
Member States have closer links with Azerbaijan. Germany, for example, has
historical links with Azerbaijan and is considered Azerbaijan’s most important
partner in western Europe.34 Azerbaijan – and this is the second point –
currently accounts for 4% of all EU oil imports.35 If energy has long linked
Azerbaijan to countries such as the UK,36 it has recently created new links,
including with traditional friends of Armenia such as Greece.37 As a result, more
Member States now have an embassy in Baku than in Yerevan.38 Whereas
29 Unlikeliness of European Security and Defence Policy mission: Huff, 2010, supra n. 5, 35; other
CFSP options: Harutyunyan, 2006, supra n. 27, 34–36; T. Diez & L. Cooley, ‘The European Union
and Conflict Transformation’, in The European Union and Global Governance. A Handbook, ed. J.-W.
Wunderlich & D. Bailey (London & NewYork: Routledge, 2011), 187–195.
30 European Parliament, ‘On the Need for an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus’ (2010), point 11, at
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:161E:0136:0147:EN:PDF>;
European Friends of Armenia, ‘Europe’s Options in Nagorno-Karabakh: An Analysis of the Views of
the European Parliament’ (2010), at <www.eufoa.org/en/publications>.
31 For example, <www.eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/com08_823_en.pdf> and <http://ec.europa.eu/
world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf>.
32 Both Armenia (<www.president.am/events/press/eng/?pn=2&id=59>) and Greece (<www.mfa.gr/
www.mfa.gr/el-GR/Policy/Geographic+Regions/Russia-Eastern+Europe-Central+Asia/Bilateral+rela
tions/Armenia/>) underline their shared cultural and historical heritage.
33 Quai d’Orsay document made available to French MEPs.
34 See <www.auswaertiges amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Aserbaidschan/Bilateral_
node.html>. Recently, however, the UK may be vying for that role. Cf. infra.
35 See <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/eu_27_info/doc/key_figures.pdf#page=5>, Slide 7.
Bulgaria, for example, imports 93.7% of its gas and oil from Azerbaijan (e-mail correspondence with
Bulgarian Ministery of Foreign Affairs, July 2011).
36 Compare <http://ukinazerbaijan.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-azerbaijan1/a-history-uk-
azerbaijan>.
37 Compare <www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/Russia+-+Eastern+Euro
pe+-+Central+Asia/Bilateral+Relations/Azerbaijan/>.
38 Baku and Yerevan: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, United
Kingdom; Baku only: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands.
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Armenia may thus have had more influential Member States behind it at the
time of the EU-15, the increasing importance of energy and the accession of
new Member States may be tilting the balance towards Azerbaijan.39 This is
connected also to the third axis of division, Russia:40 while Member States such
as Germany and France are sometimes referred to as ‘friends of Russia’,41 the
UK has been joined in its more critical stance by many of the new Member
States, especially Poland, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.42
Given Armenia’s close ties with Russia, ‘friends of Russia’ may be inclined
favourably towards Armenia, as is the case with France, for example, while
Member States that are more critical towards Russia may be more critical
towards Armenia, as exemplified by some Lithuanian politicians.43 Likewise,
‘friends of Russia’ may wish to refrain from intervention in the Russian
neighbourhood, while other Member States may wish to step up EU
involvement in conflict resolution in order to counterbalance Russian influence
in the region.
Taken together, then, these three issues show profound divisions among EU
Member States, with some more pro-Armenian, others more pro-Azeri, some
inclined to intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh, others wary to do so.44 The various
dividing lines do not run in parallel, moreover: as the examples given make clear,
Member States that are on the same side of one axis of division are not
necessarily on the same side concerning the two others. The result for Armenia
(and Azerbaijan) is that they can never be sure which Member States will
support them in the Council, depending on the issues on the table.The result for
the Union is a joint decision trap:45 a common strategy is impossible to agree
upon, and Member States pursue their own policy.
This analysis receives confirmation from a recent EU communication on
neighbourhood policy, where explicit reference is made to the devastating impact
39 Azerbaijan recently managed to get the title of an agenda point changed from ‘the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’ to ‘the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’. Compare
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st04/st04601-co01.en10.pdf>. On Azerbaijan’s
increasingly independent stance towards the EU; see T. Huseynov, ‘The EU and Azerbaijan:
Destination Unclear’, in ed. Mkrtchyan, Huseynov & Gogolashvili, 2009, supra n. 6, 49–89.
40 Huff, 2010, supra n. 5, 15–16 and 39.
41 Huseynov, 2009, supra n. 39, 58; Kratochvíl & Tulmets, 2010, supra n. 11, 136–173.
42 I. Albrycht, The Eastern Partnership in the Context of the European Neighbourhood Policy and V4 Agenda
(Cracow: Kosciuszko Institute, 2009). The attitude towards Russia in new Member States such as
Poland and the Baltics has recently changed. Cf. Huff, 2010, supra n. 5, 16.
43 The classic example is the EPP-MEP Vytautas Landsbergis. For example, <www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20110706+ITEM014+DOC+XML+V0//
EN&language=EN&query=INTERV&detail=3-528-000>.
44 Russia and the US share the same dilemma. Cf. De Waal, 2008, supra n. 7, 4.
45 F. Scharpf, ‘The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration’,
Public Administration 66, no. 3 (1988): 239–278.
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of division and competition between Member States,46 as well as from tangible
negative consequences of such disagreements. There is, for example, the EU’s
absence in the OSCE Minsk group, currently co-chaired by France, Russia, and
the United States. While the EU has expressed its readiness ‘to step up its
involvement in formats where it is not yet represented, for example, the OSCE
Minsk Group on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’,47 France is not willing to
cede its place.48 The official explanation is that it would be counterproductive to
change the chairmanship now that negotiations find themselves in the critical last
phase.Yet judging by what was said in the previous paragraph, there may well be
other reasons at play, as exemplified by a recent debate in the Assemblée nationale,
where Alain Juppé paid lip service to ‘les principes de base’49 but confirmed that
‘bien entendu, le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes constitue pour nous
le principe fondamental de tout règlement de ce conflit’.50 Other EU Member
States, of course, have different views on what should be the guiding principle(s)
in solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In Council discussions on
Nagorno-Karabakh, Cyprus, for example, has always promoted the sole principle
of territorial integrity.51
If this first example thus shows how division among Member States impedes
progress in conflict resolution, the second case illustrates that it can even cause
actual setbacks. Indeed, in 2010, Member States decided not to renew Mr
Semneby’s mandate as Special Representative for the South Caucasus: the
delegations in Yerevan and Baku, upgraded to EU delegations as a result of the
Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, would take over his role. As
was soon pointed out, however, EU delegations, being bilateral institutions, are
unable to deal with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.52 In reaction to such
46 European Commission, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European
Neighbourhood Policy’ (2011), 5, at <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf>.
47 Ibid., 6.
48 Compare Sammut, 2010, supra n. 5, 83, and Huff, 2010, supra n. 5, 35.
49 This refers to the Helsinki Final Act principles of non-use of force, territorial integrity, and equal
rights and self-determination of people, possibly complemented by the OSCE Minsk Group’s
Madrid principles, on which see Dietzen, 2011, supra n. 17.
50 <http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q13/13-3056QG.htm>. Italics added in both cases. Juppé
made the statement in response to a question asked by an MP speaking in his own name and,
significantly, in that of the Groupe d’Amitié France-Arménie, which counts no less than sixty-six
members in the Assemblée. Given such statements and the national stakes involved in it, it is hard to
see how a French ambassador with an EU mandate could be trusted with defending the EU rather
than the French position, as suggested by Sammut, 2010, supra n. 5, 82–83.
51 Compare Cyprus’ reaction to Kosovo’s declaration of independence at <www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/
mfa2006.nsf/All/09C1075976DA0F32C22573E2002ED1C5?OpenDocument&print>. That Cyprus
defends the same position within the Council regarding Nagorno-Karabakh was confirmed to the
author in interviews.
52 R. Cristescu & A. Paul, ‘EU and Nagorno-Karabakh: A “Better Than Nothing” Approach’, EU
Observer, 15 Mar. 2011, at <http://euobserver.com/?aid=31989>. Babayan’s (2011, supra n. 1, 3)
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criticisms, the EU appointed Philippe Lefort as the new EU Special
Representative for the South Caucasus as of September 2011. Although the EU
thus lacked a Special Representative for the South Caucasus for no more than
six months, it has thrown away ‘important expertise and, more importantly,
contact channels into the conflict regions’.53 While the decision to remove Mr
Semneby is thus clearly to the detriment of the EU as a whole, it may well have
been intended by certain Member States precisely with the aim of destroying his
expertise and contacts.54 The UK, for example, may have been upset at his
proposal to apply the principle of ‘non-recognition but engagement’ to
Nagorno-Karabakh because Azerbaijan, with which the UK has close economic
ties, does not agree with it. France, for its part, may have feared Semneby’s
ambition to design a ‘comprehensive EU policy for the South Caucasus’55 – a
statement that may have been read in Paris as a candidature for the
co-chairmanship of the Minsk group. In rational choice institutionalist terms,
then, Mr Semneby’s removal presents a clear example of a principal sanctioning
agent slippage.
In conclusion, the Council seems less willing than ever to make use of its
exclusive power over a crucial aspect of EU policy towards Armenia, as reasons
for supporting Armenia and Azerbaijan even themselves out not just between the
various Member States but also within many important Member States: if
widespread support for Armenia within the EU-15 may account for Armenia’s
relatively favourable treatment at an earlier stage, the EU’s enlargement and its
increased concern for energy supply now lead the Council to avoid any
game-changing moves for fear of losing on either side.The price for this inaction
is a lose-lose situation not only for Armenia and Azerbaijan, which continue to
be at war, but also, in the long run, for the EU itself as the conflict jeopardizes
the EU’s aim of a secure, prosperous, and democratic neighbourhood in the
South Caucasus.
proposal to replace the various member states’ representatives in the OSCE Minsk Group with the
heads of Delegation therefore makes no sense.
53 Fischer & Lannon, 2011, supra n. 1, 5.
54 Compare Sammut, 2010, supra n. 5, 83, and European Voice, ‘A poor Start for Central Europe’s EU
Presidencies’, 24 Mar. 2011.
55 <www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/foreign-policy/eu-special-representatives/former-special-represent
atives/peter-semneby.aspx?lang=en>.
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5 THE COMMISSION:TO BE OR NOT TO BE,THAT IS THE
QUESTION
Ever since the latest EU enlargements, the Commission has been so active in the
neighbourhood56 as to generate rumours that it ‘invented’ the neighbourhood in
order to make up for the loss of enlargement, considered one of the most
successful Commission initiatives ever not only in terms of positive outcome for
the central and eastern European countries but also in terms of institutional
self-consolidation.57 As demonstrated in the previous section, however, the
Commission’s most important initiatives in the Eastern neighbourhood, ENP and
EaP, have been hamstrung by the fact that foreign and security policy proper
comes under the Council. Previous scholars, as stated in the introduction, have
pointed out another factor that has hampered the ENP: the inconsistent
application of conditionality. This section examines two recent initiatives taken
by, or at least prominently involving, the Commission that have sought to tackle
these two problems.
The first initiative is the Commission’s NAENP. In a joint communication
dated 25 May 2011, the HR/VP and the Commission suggested that the way
forward for the ENP is ‘more for more’: more funds than before will be made
available to the EU’s neighbours, yet stricter conditionality will determine how
much each country receives. While the EaP had already stepped up the EU’s
offer to the Eastern neighbours (‘more’) in reaction to criticism regarding the
lack of ENP incentives, the NAENP’s most important innovation regards the
emphasis put on political conditionality (‘for more’). Fair though this principle
may sound, its application can be problematic for various reasons.58 For a start,
how does one determine ‘progress in building and consolidating democracy’:59
does one assess neighbouring countries on their relative or on their absolute
levels of progress? Furthermore, even if a clear decision is taken in favour of the
former, as was done for past conditional ENP funds,60 how does one determine
56 For example, Christensen, 2010, supra n. 6; Huff, 2010, supra n. 5, 11.
57 Influence of enlargement policy on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): A. Magen, ‘The
Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance?’, CDDRL
Working Papers 68 (Stanford: Centre on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, 2008),
383–427; E. Tulmets, ‘Alter Wein in neuen Programmen: Von der Osterweiterung zur ENP’,
Osteuropa 57 (2007): 2–3. Commission’s cultivated spill-overs in enlargement policy: J. Orbie, Theorie
van de Europese integratie: Ideeën, belangen en instellingen (Leuven & Den Haag:Acco, 2009), 42.
58 Arguments to abandon conditionality: Fischer & Lannon, 2011, supra n. 1, 4; Grant, 2011, supra n. 2,
10.
59 High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy & European
Commission, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European
Neighbourhood Policy’ (2011), 6, at <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf>.
60 European Commission, ‘Principles for the Implementation of a Governance Facility under ENPI’
(2008), 8, at <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/governance_facility_en.pdf>.
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the precise level of relative progress towards democratization?61 Lest they suggest
that the EU be failing in its neighbourhood, Progress Reports almost invariably
emphasize positive over negative evolutions. In the overall assessment of the
Report for 2008, for example, post-election violence was treated in one
sentence.62 As a result, Armenia’s democratization, including recent government
overtures towards the opposition, looks much better on paper than it does in
practice.63 It remains to be seen to what extent NAENP Progress Reports will
entail a change in this respect, especially given the greater involvement of partner
countries in progress assessment under the NAENP.64 Suppose the NAENP does
call problems by their names, the next question is to what extent a country such
as Armenia would effectively be punished for that. Officials suggest that the
Commission cannot but take sanctions against Armenia if, in the upcoming
elections cycle, the 2008 post-election violence would repeat itself: the EU is too
strong a normative power not to break off path dependency if its basic principles
are not respected in the neighbourhood. Past experiences with conditional funds,
however, suggest otherwise.The ENP Governance Facility, for example, intended
to reward neighbours making the greatest progress, received but a small amount
of money due to inter-institutional debates.65 In addition, the money available
for the first round was awarded more or less equally between Eastern and
Southern neighbours not on the basis of merit but because of the importance
attached by the Southern Member States to the Mediterranean neighbours.66
More than with interests overriding norms and ideas, the reason EU
conditionality failed lies, again, with intra- and inter-institutional competition.67
61 Compare K. Smith, ‘The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy’, International Affairs 81,
no. 4 (2005): 757–773, at 764.
62 European Commission, ‘Progress Report Armenia: 2008’ (2009), 2, at <http://ec.europa.eu/
world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_511_en.pdf>.
63 Compare Babayan, 2011, supra n. 1, 2–3; R. Giragosian, ‘From Partisan Confrontation to Political
Stalemate: The Struggle for Stability in Armenia’, in ed. Hug, 2011, supra n. 1, 16–20; J. Hale,
‘Progress towards Democracy Slows in ENP Partners Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia’, OSI
Articles, 31 May 2011, at <www.soros.org/initiatives/brussels/articles_publications>; H. Kostanyan,
‘Spillovers from the Arab Revolts: Is Armenia Next in Line?’, CEPS Policy Brief 236 (Brussels:
Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011); V. Shkolnikov, ‘European Assistance to Human Rights,
Democracy and Rule of Law in Armenia: Incremental Results, No Breakthrough’, in ed. Hug, 2011,
supra n. 1, 51–53.
64 Mikhelidze, 2009, supra n. 2, 4.
65 M. Emerson, G. Noutcheva & N. Popescu, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years On:
Time Indeed for an “ENP Plus”’, CEPS Policy Brief 126 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy
Studies, 2007), 23.
66 R. Youngs, ‘Is European Democracy Promotion on the Wane?’, CEPS Working Document 292
(Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008), 3. For Ukraine’s reaction to similar cases, cf.
Grant, 2011, supra n. 2.
67 Fischer & Lannon, 2011, supra n. 1, 6; the ENP therefore cannot be said to have substantially
diminished tensions between Member States over foreign policy preferences. In fact, interest in ENP
and Eastern Partnership (EaP) in general greatly fluctuates with Member State presidencies. Cf.
Mikhelidze, 2009, supra n. 2;Albrycht, 2009, supra n. 42.
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The second initiative to be discussed here regards the reforms introduced
under the Lisbon Treaty in order to counter institutional compartmentalization,
including, first and foremost, the creation of the EEAS. In theory, the EEAS is
composed of ‘officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the
Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national
diplomatic services of the Member States’ (Article 27/3 TEU). As far as the
neighbourhood is concerned, however, EEAS staff almost invariably derives from
the Commission. What is more, the neighbourhood still has its own specific
Commissioner, Štefan Füle.68 One way of explaining this anomaly is that taking
over all of the EU’s external actions at once would have been too big a job for
the newly installed HR/VP Lady Ashton. Another explanation is that the
Commission uses the neighbourhood to keep an important voice in external
policy after the completion of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. That
inter-institutional competition rather than collaboration may lie behind the
co-existence of a HR/VP and a Commissioner is confirmed by the fact that
Ashton and Füle have different visions on what the EU’s policy in its
neighbourhood should look like. Disagreement between them was recently so
strong, in fact, as to cause repeated delays in the publication of the NAENP.69
When the NAENP was finally launched, it brought to the surface another
problem facing the HR/VP: while the joint communication on the NAENP
presented the twenty-four-page result of a careful balancing act between the
HR/VP and the Commission, the Council reaction to the document presented a
rather different view:70 no more than four pages long, the Council conclusions
leave out many elements that neighbouring countries, backed by Füle and
eventually by Ashton, deemed crucially important, such as the reference to
Article 49 TEU.71 At least in this particular instance, then, the HR/VP does not
seem to have derived great power from her much-praised double-hatted
position:72 mistrusted for her HR hat by the Commission and for her VP hat by
68 Officially, the EEAS is responsible for programming, the Commission for implementing the ENP, yet
the division risks being less clear-cut on the ground given the EEAS’s staff composition for the EaP
countries.
69 T. Vogel, ‘Commission to Present New Neighbourhood Policy’, European Voice, 20 May 2011, at
<www.europeanvoice.com/article/2011/may/commission-to-present-new-neighbourhood-policy/71
145.aspx>. The marked preference of Armenian officials and lobby groups for Füle over Ashton
suggests that neighbouring countries are exploiting European institutional disagreements.
70 Compare Art. 18/2 Treaty of European Union.
71 Council, ‘Council Conclusions on the European Neighbourhood Policy’ (2011), at
<www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/122917.pdf>. As partner
countries had lately come to appreciate the EEAS for not telling them off with the Member States
as an excuse, interviews made clear that the Council’s lack of enthusiasm came as a particular
disappointment.
72 For the institutional explanation for, and risks of, this double-hatted position, see Crum, 2006, supra
n. 9, 397.
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the Council, the HR/VP risks getting squashed between these two powerful
institutions. If so, she would become living proof of the devastating impact of
inter-institutional competition on the ENP. If, on the other hand, the HR/VP
manages to become the embodiment of an institutionalized dialogue between
the Commission and the Council, her role holds much promise. It remains to be
seen which way the role of the HR/VP will develop.
For many years, so we can conclude, the Commission has been
administering73 deficient medicines to Armenia in the sense that ENP or EaP
contribution to progress towards democratization, and a fortiori towards prosperity
or security, has been less than satisfactory. The main reason for this failure, once
more, turned out to be the EU’s institutional set-up: while trade-offs between
Member States led to the inconsistent application of conditionality, competition
between the Council and the Commission curtailed the NAENP even before its
launch.Two recent initiatives have sought to tackle these problems, yet these too
risk to be insufficient to cure the EU’s ills: unless the newly installed HR/VP
can carve out an indispensable role for herself as the embodiment of
inter-institutional dialogue between the Council and the Commission, she risks
being crushed by what has been shown throughout this article to be a decisive
explanation for the EU’s failure in its neighbourhood: the Union’s institutional
turf wars.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In the wake of the Jasmine revolutions, politicians and scholars have wondered
why the EU has failed to create a secure, democratic, and prosperous
neighbourhood. Many have accused the fact that interests have overridden ideas:
the EU has preferred to do business with dictators over stimulating democratic
movements. The most commonly proposed solution is therefore a reinforcement
of conditionality, as exemplified by the recently proposed NAENP. Yet apart
from the fact that conditionality is sometimes inefficient – as in the case of a
regime as affluent as Azerbaijan’s – or even counterproductive – generalized
mobility restrictions are, after all, not conducive to grassroot democratization
movements – past attempts in this direction have invariably failed. Before trying
the same remedy again, it is therefore worthwhile to ask why it has not
succeeded in the past. Likewise, investigation is in place into the reasons behind
the other obstacle that has been identified to impede an efficient neighbourhood
policy: the lack of integration between ENP and EaP on the one hand, and
73 ENP and EaP have indeed been criticized for being administrative rather than political instruments.
Cf. Schäffer & Tolksdorf, 2009, supra n. 5, 4; Grant, 2011, supra n. 2; Huff, 2010, supra n. 5, 39.
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CFSP and ESDP on the other.This article has located the root of both problems
with the EU’s institutional set-up.
In the case of Armenia, it was shown how recent Commission initiatives
were jeopardized by Member State trade-offs, how the HR/VP has to fight for
survival amidst a Council-Commission turf war, how the Council’s joint decision
trap has led to a lowest common-denominator approach to the detriment of the
EU and Armenia alike, and how Parliament has, in spite of its ambitions,
sidelined itself by a lack of internal coherence. Taken together, these instances of
intra- and inter-institutional competition allow to explain the past, understand
the present, and, to some extent, predict the future of EU-Armenia relations.
Armenia’s relatively favourable treatment under the EU’s early initiatives towards
the South Caucasus, for example, can be accounted for by the support that
Armenia garnered from influential Member States in the EU-12 and -15. If a
joint decision trap for a long time ensured its continuation, the increased
importance of energy, the accession of the central and eastern European
countries, and the EU’s self-presentation as a normative power now seem to be
pushing in a different direction, where Armenia may have to compete with other
neighbouring countries for EU support. The power of new initiatives that take
into account these evolutions should not be overestimated, however: past
experiences suggest that ideas (e.g., democratization) or interests (e.g., energy)
have seldom been able to override path dependency.This time around, of course,
an institutional reform has been added to the balance.Yet it remains to be seen
whether the HR/VP will make a real difference or whether she herself will
become a victim of the turf wars that she has been appointed to overcome.
At first sight, Armenia may seem a unique case as the EU’s engagement with
most other ENP partner countries can be accounted for by either ideas – as in
the case of Georgia with its strong pro-European discourse – or interests – as in
the case of Azerbaijan with its oil reserves. Closer inspection shows, however, that
many other partners too have substantial communities living in Member States
to lobby for them, have powerful neighbours whom many EU Member States
would not wish to offend, or are involved in conflicts that divide the Council. In
their case too, then, the model proposed here for the failure of the EU’s policy
towards Armenia may hold at least part of the clue. More generally, such
institutional explanations are of course not unique to the EU’s neighbourhood
policy: in other domains too, the EU’s policy has been shown to be determined
by its institutional structure. If the institutional framework has been neglected in
previous analyses of EU relations with its neighbourhood, this article has shown
that it holds important lessons for the past, present, and future of neighbourhood
policy too.
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